Individuals and Judges in Defense of the Rule of Law by Dupré, Catherine
Catherine Dupré Sa 28 Jul 2018 Sa 28 Jul 2018
Individuals and Judges in Defense of the Rule of Law
verfassungsblog.de/individuals-and-judges-in-defense-of-the-rule-of-law/
The LM Court of Justice Grand Chamber ruling of 25 July 2018 (Case C-216/18 PPU) has
been long awaited by all those following the development of the so-called rule of law crisis
in the EU. It was possibly also a welcome opportunity for the Court of Justice itself, which
appears keen to make its mark on this fast-developing field of EU law, after what might
have felt like a series of frustrating rulings that made little difference to the situation on the
ground (e.g. the ruling on the forced early retirement of Hungarian judges). In many ways,
this case illustrates EU constitutionalism at its best: despite not being obliged to do so, the
Irish judge made a request under Article 267 TEU, bringing together concerns raised by the
pending Article 7 TEU procedure and the more technical and narrow issue of fair trial under
Article 47 EU Charter. While the ECJ follows the path opened in Aranyosi for assessing the
‘real risk of breach’ under Article 47 EU Charter, in interpreting that provision it manages to
weave in the wider Article 7 TEU contextual concerns as well, thereby considerably
strengthening the constitutional status of the right to a fair trial.
At first glance, in LM the Court of Justice appears to make decisive strides with regard to
the rule of law, stepping up as a key participant in the discussion triggered by reforms to
the judiciary in Poland and Hungary: the ECJ has not waited for Article 7 TEU proceedings
1/3
to come to an end in order to devise its own tests and assessment mechanisms, inviting
Member States’ courts to apply them. The LM case can certainly therefore be understood
as a strong promotion of the role of Member States’ courts in assessing the so-called rule
of law crisis and related attacks on judicial independence in fellow Member States.
However, contrary to what some observers might have expected, the ECJ makes no
comment on the quality of the rule of law in Poland. Instead, the significance of LM lies in
how the ECJ sets up (building on Aranyosi) a parallel procedure for domestic judges to
address Article 7 TEU-type concerns in relation to the rule of law. For a start, Article 7 TEU
documentation is included for the purpose of the abstract stage of the Aranyosi test (para
61), and doing so is very likely to lead to a finding of a real risk of breach of the right to a
fair trial. However, there is no automatic causality, and it is for domestic courts to undertake
this assessment.
The guidance provided by the ECJ focuses on structural issues, specifically judicial
independence, with detailed guidance about the nature of external and internal pressure on
judges. This could still be clearer, however. Firstly, the ECJ does not specify whether the
external pressure criterion applies to the Polish court involved in the given European Arrest
Warrant (EAW), to the entire judiciary in Poland, or to all the courts likely to be involved in
the EAW case (para 63). Secondly, the ECJ provides no guidance –procedural or
substantive – on the expected quality of criminal proceedings, which is the core issue in
EAW. Finally, the ECJ’s total silence in relation to the European Court of Human Rights
and its case law has to be noted here, differing in this respect from NS and Aranyosi. This
might be explained partly by the lack of immediately relevant ECHR case law (unlike in the
previous rulings). However, the case law on Article 6 ECHR is plentiful and might have
provided valuable further guidance in LM, especially noting Articles 52.3 and 53 of the EU
Charter which invite the ECJ to refer to the ECHR and its case law when there is a
correspondence between the ECHR and the Charter rights.
Unlike the broad perspectives adopted by the EU Commission and the Venice
Commission, the ECJ construction of the rule of law in LM ultimately focusses on the right
to a fair trial. While this may be considered as a very narrow understanding of the rule of
law, from a theoretical and contextual perspective, this raises the constitutional status of the
right to a fair trial in an unprecedented manner, turning it into both the hallmark of the rule
of law and a useful diagnostic tool for assessing the real risk of a breach. The ECJ does so
by establishing an explicit continuum between the right to fair trial (Article 47 EU Charter),
the principle of judicial independence and the commitment to the rule of law under Article 2
TEU (para 48). Semantically and politically this is not a big, or indeed controversial, step to
take and the ECJ can hardly be criticized for activism (especially maybe by the Polish
authorities, if this is whom the ECJ has in mind). The significance of this continuum is
however far-reaching.
Firstly, it gives the rather abstract value of the ‘rule of law’ under Article 2 a very clear and
concrete meaning, that is easy to understand by judges. Secondly, it arguably invites
further normative connections to be established between other Article 2 TEU values and –
presumably – all the EU Charter rights, opening up interesting hermeneutic possibilities.
This in due course might be a useful way of strengthening the normative status of some of
the EU Charter provisions, especially those considered as general claims or objectives
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rather than distinct fundamental rights. As can be seen in LM, the connection established
by the ECJ between Article 47 EU Charter and Article 2 TEU elevates the normative status
of the right to a fair trial to that of the absolute prohibition of inhuman treatment (under
Article 4 EU Charter). This enhanced normative treatment justifies making an exception to
the core principle of mutual trust and mutual recognition underpinning the entire EU law
system and the EAW in particular.
More precisely, in practice, only ‘a real risk of breach’ is enough to justify protective
measures (as per NS and Aranyosi), and further checks as in LM (the second step in the
test). In this respect, the take-home message of the ECJ in LM is that the right to a fair trial
– while not framed in absolute terms by the EU Charter – is so important that it requires the
same judicial attention and protection as the absolute rights guaranteed under Title 1
(dignity) of the EU Charter (Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5). In so doing, the ECJ makes a welcome
and potent addition to this title, highlighting the procedural dimension of human dignity, and
completing the construction of these core rights’ protection. It also gives courts and
individuals a tool – the right to a fair trial – to protect absolute rights when they are at risk
due to large scale breaches of the rule of law, as well as (presumably) of other Article 2
values.
As a result, in the normal functioning of the judiciary as seen in Melloni, mutual trust can
allow a lower level of protection of fair trial, including legal defence rights, in fellow Member
States. By contrast, in situations of a real risk of ‘systemic generalised deficiencies’, the
right to a fair trial trumps mutual trust, and checks have to be made on the quality of the
trial. In ruling in this way, the ECJ draws a clear line between what can be a healthy level of
constitutional pluralism and what can no longer be considered pluralism, but a threat to EU
absolute rights (Title 1 EU Charter) and to its foundational values (Article 2 TEU), justifying
constitutional distrust.
The LM case ultimately reminds us that safeguarding the rule of law is not the exclusive
responsibility of the institutions listed under Article 7 TEU: it is also the responsibility of
judges and of individuals. This is a message perhaps intended for the EU Commission,
which is not known for having been quick to act in this field, and perhaps also an
encouragement to those judges in Poland (and Hungary) who are committed to a fair trial.
The ECJ’s silence about the – actual and possible – roles of the European Court of Human
Rights is particularly disturbing and might confirm the quiet competition between the two
courts ongoing since the rejection of ECHR accession. Considering the especially strict
limitation of individual access to the ECJ, it might be recalled that one court – albeit it the
ECJ – might not always be enough for safeguarding the rule of law.
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